Values
also Value judgments
What one acts to gain or keep; in Objectivism the standards behind one's choices, and the source of emotions, which reflect one's value judgments.
In Objectivism, a value is what one acts to gain or keep, and values are the standards by which one chooses. Rand links values tightly to emotion: emotions are not primaries but automatic responses that reflect one’s stored value judgments — you feel good about what you appraise as good for you, bad about what you appraise as a threat. Emotions thus carry information about ideas already held, not independent knowledge.
CF accepts this link between values and emotions but reframes how to act on it. Because emotions express ideas, they are open to rational examination and correction — not to be obeyed as oracles, nor suppressed by willpower. CF’s advice is to introspect non-judgmentally: understand what part of you wants or values before trying to change a feeling, and assume an emotional reaction is at least partly right rather than fully irrational. When an emotion conflicts with an explicit idea, the goal is a win/win solution that satisfies every part of the personality, not a war to destroy one side.
CF also criticizes Rand’s framing of values around selfishness. It prefers a no-conflicts-of-interest, win/win account in which rational interests do not genuinely clash. On CF’s view many divergent ultimate goals converge on the same intermediate values — error correction, honesty, free speech, peace — so disputes about values are matters for objective inquiry and moral judgment, not arbitrary preference.