Proof

A proof claims to demonstrate that an idea is true, ruling out the possibility of error. CF, following Critical Rationalism, holds that no such positive proof of truth is attainable. The reason is a logical asymmetry: a single accepted criticism can refute an idea because it contradicts it, but no quantity of confirming data or supporting arguments can imply, or even hint, that an idea is correct. The relationship of positive arguments to the idea they favor is merely failure to contradict it, and there are always infinitely many rival ideas that share those same favorable traits yet reach different conclusions. So even an argument that rules out 500 potential errors still cannot guarantee a 501st was not missed.

Demanding proof is therefore central to justificationism and, ultimately, to infallibilism: the project of making ideas true or “less fallible” runs against fallibilism, the permanent human condition that any idea may contain an undetected error.

CF adds a distinctive practical point. Saying “prove it” or invoking a “burden of proof” is not a criticism. A criticism explains why an idea fails to solve some problem; mere absence of proof explains nothing. If an idea is clear and you can find nothing wrong with it besides the lack of proof, you should not reject it. Ideas earn no status from proofs, only from being non-refuted in pursuit of a goal.